Changes in the positions of domestic manufacturers in the regional market because of offset contracts’ supplies of medicinal products

Abstract


Pharmaceutical production is the leader in concluding contracts with counter investment obligations (offset contracts) among all industries. The bulk of contracts are concluded in Moscow, the largest regional market of medicinal products. The objective of the study was to determine the trends in structural changes in the Moscow pharmaceutical market after the start of deliveries under all offset contracts concluded at the beginning of April 2024. The study was based on the information from the official website of the Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement and data by DSM Group on medicinal products sales. The volume and structure of the market in the base period (2021) was compared with average annual supply figures under concluded offset contracts. In the period under review, 8 offset contracts were concluded in Moscow for the supply of drugs from 139 INN groups. In the base period the total supplies volume for 139 INNs under the regional programs of preferential drug provision, which are the focus of the offset contracts’ supplies, amounted to 13.4 billion rubles. According to the calculation model, as the result of offset contracts’ supplies, the total share of Russian manufacturers in the market of 139 INNs in the segment of the regional programs may increase from 16.6% to 63.6%, in the total government procurement market — from 23.5% to 45.8%, in the entire Moscow market (including retail sales) — from 18.6% to 31%. It was shown that already in the base period the share of Russian manufacturers was more than 90% in the segments of 24% INN, and more than 50% — in segments of 33% INN. In this regard, the advisability of further producers’ stimulation looks questionable, if we mean not attracting investments in the development of production in a specific region but achieving the goals of import substitution and maintaining competition in the public procurements of medicinal products in the all-Russian market. As a result of the implementation of the offset contracts’ supplies, with consideration of specific INN segments, a significant increase in domestic manufacturers’ share of the Moscow pharmaceutical market can be expected. At the same time, offset contracts’ supplies limit competition in the public procurement system with respect to other Russian manufacturers and create additional competitive advantages for attracting investment in Moscow preventing of the development of other regional pharmaceutical clusters.

About the authors

Elena O. Trofimova

St. Petersburg State Chemical and Pharmaceutical University, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Email: elena.trofimova@pharminnotech.com

Yuliya A. Aleshechkina

St. Petersburg State Chemical and Pharmaceutical University, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Email: 002

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